Do Acceding Countries Need Higher Fiscal Deficits? by Malgorzata Antczak
 
 
  S t u d i a   i   A n a l i z y  
S t u d i e s   &   A n a l y s e s  
 
 
Centrum Analiz  




Center for Social 

























Warsaw, November 2003  
 
Materials  published  here  have  a  working  paper  character.  They  can  be  subject  to  further 
publication. The views and opinions expressed here reflect the author(s) point of view and not 




The  paper  was  prepared  within  the  research  project  entitled:  Strategie  przystąpienia  do 
Europejskiej  Unii  Gospodarczej  i  Walutowej:  analiza  porównawcza  możliwych  scenariuszy 
(Strategies for Joining the European Economic and Monetary Union: a Comparative Analysis of 







Keywords:  accession  countries,  aquis  communautaire,  contribution  fee,  enlargement, 











© CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw 2003 
 
Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury 
 
ISSN 1506-1701, ISBN: 83-7178-311-6 
Publisher: 
CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research 
12 Sienkiewicza, 00-944 Warsaw, Poland 

























Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 5 
Introduction................................................................................................................................... 6 
The starting fiscal positions of acceding countries.................................................................. 7 
The impact of EU transfers on the New Member States............................................................ 9 
Co-financing........................................................................................................................... 12 
The financial contributions of the new Member States........................................................... 13 
Cost-benefit analysis of accession – net financial positions  
of the new Member States................................................................................................... 15 
Net fiscal positions in acceding countries............................................................................... 19 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 23 
References................................................................................................................................... 24 
  































Malgorzata Antczak graduated from the Department of Economics at the Warsaw University (MA in 
1994). She has been collaborating with the CASE Foundation since 1994. Mrs. Antczak’s research 
interests include economics of transition and European integration in Central and Eastern Europe 
and  ownership  changes  in  the  Polish  enterprise  sector  during  transition.  She  has  also  been 
interested in fiscal aspects of the EU enlargement and fiscal convergence in acceding countries. 
Moreover, Mrs.  Antczak  has  worked  on  issues  of  education  financing  and  its  influence  on  the 
elasticity of the labor market in Poland and conducted financial analysis of enterprises quoted at 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange market.  
























The  paper  outlines  the  probable  fiscal  consequences  of  the  accession  process  for  the 
candidate  countries  and  presents  specific,  fiscally  sensitive  aspects  of  acquis  communautaire 
adoption.  Apart  from  membership  contribution  fees,  enlargement-related  expenditures,  never 
financed from the budget before, may additionally influence a public expenditure increase and a 
further deterioration of fiscal deficit to a level exceeding current values. To estimate the future net 
fiscal positions of acceding countries, the paper calculates the net financial position of each 
acceding  country  as  a  net  gain  from  the  negotiated  EU  transfers.  The  net  financial  position 
illustrates the net effect of the transfer flow to a given acceding country (including the government 
sector and other beneficiaries of the EU assistance) and from that country into the EU budget. The 
net  fiscal  position  represents  the  net  effect  of  accession  on  the  government  sector  with  the 
consideration of EU transfer flows to that sector, accession-related expenditures from the budget, 
as  well  as  the  positive  fiscal  effects  of  accession.  The  paper  discusses  the  crucial  issue  in 
assessing the net fiscal position in the AC-10, namely the fact that negotiated transfers barely 
cover the latest and major budget obligations.  




The legislation of the EU does not directly  regulate budget procedure in the new Member 
States. However, acceding countries need to take on board various new and important budgetary 
and financial provisions. After accession, the acceding countries will face additional pressures to 
increase  expenditures  associated  with  EU  integration.  This  pressure,  furthermore,  is  likely  to 
outweigh financial benefits (from EU transfers, for example), especially in the early stages of their 
membership. 
New financial provisions require the establishment and implementation of budgets based on 
the  following  two  principles:  one,  that  the  annual  budgetary  deficits  of  the  government  sector 
(central  budget  and  local  governments)  do  not  exceed  3  percent  of  GDP;  two,  that  over  the 
medium-term perspective, the general government sector revenues and expenditures should be 
kept close to balance or in surplus
2
. These requirements are in line with both the Maastricht criteria 
and Stability and Growth Pact which is binding on all Member States. 
The main objective of this paper is to outline the likely key fiscal consequences of candidate 
countries’ accession. One should bear in mind that there are many uncertainties as to the future 
fiscal stance of the new Member States and that the actual costs of accession are not easy to 
estimate.  
A number of Pre-Accession Economic Programs, most of which came into existence in 2002, 
are somewhat short on concrete policy commitments that could credibly underpin medium-term 
fiscal consolidation. Most do not stress to a sufficient extent the efforts required to correct existing 
imbalances or to meet the potential costs of structural reform. Moreover, the National Development 
Plans  (published  at  the  beginning  of  2003  and  reviewed  in  July  2003  by  the  European 
Commission) fail to tackle in any detailed way the financial consequences of implementing the 
necessary structural reforms and other enlargement-related expenditures
3
.  
After the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, some significant uncertainties about the 
size  of  net  gains  from  negotiated  transfers  to  the  acceding  countries  persist.  Two  issues  with 
regard to future fiscal positions are crucial: one, it is still not decided how much of the transfers 
may  fuel  the  general  government  (and  how  much  will  be  directed  to  other  recipients  of  EU 
assistance); two, it is not yet known how much of the transfers it will be possible to absorb in 
practice. A modest absorption of EU financial sources threatens not only the budget, but the whole 
                                                  
1
 The author is grateful for their comments to Pawel Samecki from the National Bank of Poland and Sandor Richter 
from the WIIW (Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies). 
2 Avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence to the relevant provisions of the Stability and Growth 
Pact are also required (Art. 104, title VII of the EC Treaty and the other EMU acquis). 
3 In a further follow-up, in its comprehensive monitoring report into structural reform to be published in November 
2003, and in its Lisbon reports for the Spring European Council, the European Commission is invited to devote particular 
attention to the most urgent challenges identified in the report. Enlargement will be a special subject in the Economic 
Policy Committee (EPC) Annual Report on Structural Reforms in 2004.  
                                                                   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 260 – Malgorzata Antczak 
7 
economy  as  well.  Moreover,  it  is  very  important  to  distinguish  between  planned  and  actual 
transfers. Commitment appropriations and payment appropriations are both planning categories.  
In order to estimate the future net fiscal positions of acceding countries, this paper calculates 
the net financial position of each acceding country (as a net gain from negotiated EU transfers). 
The net financial position illustrates the net  effect of the flow of transfers to a given acceding 
country (including the government sector and all other beneficiaries of EU assistance) and from 
that country into the EU budget. The net fiscal position represents the net effect of accession on 
the  government  sector,  taking  into  consideration  EU  transfer  flows  to  the  government  sector, 
accession-related expenditures coming out of the state budgets, as well as some positive fiscal 
effects of accession.  
Enlargement-related  expenditures  are  consequences  of  the  adoption  of  specific,  fiscally 
sensitive,  acquis  communautaire  in  the  fields  such  as  environmental  protection,  infrastructure, 
public administration reform, etc.  Apart from the membership contribution fee, these expenses 
(which  have  never  been  financed  from  the  budget  before)  can  additionally  influence  public 
expenditure increases and the deterioration in the fiscal deficit to a level exceeding current values. 
The crucial issue in assessing the net fiscal position in the AC-10 is that the negotiated transfers 
cover the latest and most major budget obligations to a very limited extent, as will be presented in 
this paper.  
The starting fiscal positions of acceding countries 
Most of the acceding countries arrive at the point of EU accession carrying unstable fiscal 
positions and accompanied by slowing economic growth rates (see the recent examples of Poland 
and Hungary). Most of the applicants have high and rising fiscal deficits (in some cases chronically 
so). As Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) demonstrate, most of the applicants’ budget deficits are both 
structural  and  cyclical  in  their  character.  Fiscal  positions  in  transition  economies  are  very 
vulnerable to changes in real GDP growth. Furthermore, because of the higher volatility of output 
and the high level of public investment (including expenditure related to EU accession) in these 
countries, the risk of surpassing the 3 percent of GDP limit is that much higher. 
General government balances continue to be negative in most candidate countries. For the 
AC-10 group as a whole, aggregate general government deficits (in ESA 95 terms) reached 5.3 
percent of their GDP in 2002
4
, mainly due to the sharp increase in the Hungarian deficit
5
. These 
aggregate deficits are expected to fall to 4.4 percent of GDP in 2004, though differences between 
                                                  
4  Weighted  average,  using  GDP  converted  at  market  exchange  rates,  according  to  Table  1.  The  April  2003 
notifications (European Commission, 2003c) show that the average general government deficit for the ten acceding 
countries (also in ESA 95 terms) deteriorated from 3.8% of GDP in 2001 to 4.7% of GDP in 2002 and is planned to 
improve only very slightly to 4.2% of GDP in 2003.  
5 Data presented in this section are provided by European Commission (2003a, 2003c). Further analysis shows the 
deficit increases as a consequence  of  membership-related expenditure  increases, something not considered by the 
Commission.  
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the countries are important. According to official European Commission sources, the deficits for of 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia are expected to be lower than 2 percent in 2003, while the Czech, 
Maltese and Slovak deficits are expected to reach more than 5 percent of GDP in 2003. For the 10 
acceding countries as a whole the forecast foresees deficits of at least 3 percent in 6 countries in 
2003, and the same in 2004. Nevertheless, except for Estonia and Lithuania, the forecasts point to 
a trend towards somewhat lower deficits over the forecast horizon, with particularly remarkable 
improvements in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. 
Table 1. General government balance (as a percentage of GDP), forecast for candidate countries (CC-13) 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005* 
Cyprus  -3  -3.5  -4  -3.5  -0.3 
Czech Republic  -5.5  -6.5  -6.3  -5.9  -5.5 
Estonia  0.5  1.3  -0.5  -0.6  0.0 
Hungary  -4.2  -9.1  -4.9  -3.7  -2.5 
Latvia  -1.9  -2.5  -2.9  -2.6  -2.0 
Lithuania  -2.3  -1.8  -1.9  -2  -1.5 
Malta  -7  -6.1  -5.2  -4.1  -3.1 
Poland  -3.1  -4.2  -4.2  -4  -2.2 
Slovakia  -5.4  -7.7  -5.3  -3.8  -2.6 
Slovenia  -2.5  -1.8  -1.5  -1.2  -0.8 
Acceding countries (AC-10)  -3.7  -5.3  -4.4  -3.9  - 
Bulgaria  0.4  -0.7  -0.6  -0.5  0.0 
Romania  -3.3  -2.6  -2.7  -2.7  -2.4 
Turkey  -28.9  -13.7  -9.8  -6.9  -0.5 
Candidate countries (CC-13)  -12.4  -7.1  -5.7  -4.7  - 
Notes :  
- aggregate across countries weighted using GDP converted at market exchange rates 
- government deficits not yet comparable across countries 
- attempts have been made to use a definition as close as possible to general government net lending 
* Data for 2005 comes from the earlier source: Evaluation of the 2002 pre-accession economic programs of candidate 
countries, European Commission (2002b). Data for 2005 is not, in fact, a forecast (of independent forecasting 
institution) but the declaration of a political will (or rather wishful thinking, as the further analysis shows) of each 
government preparing pre-accession economic program.   
 Source: European Commission (2002b, 2003a) 
General government deficits in most of the larger countries are increasing, for various reasons: 
the  effects  of  the  economic  slowdown,  anti-cyclical  loosening  of  fiscal  policy,  loosening  before 
elections  in  some  countries,  social  expenditure  increases,  transition-related  expenditures  on 
enterprise or banking restructuring, for example, as well as greater accuracy in measurements due 
to  more  transparent  fiscal  accounting  of  expenditures  and  revenues.  However,  despite  the 
increasing transparency in public finances, the deficits presented here are neither fully comparable  
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across  countries,  nor  yet  fully  in  line  with  EU  definitions.  As  the  harmonization  of  statistics 
progresses, significant revisions of general government deficits are still possible
6
. 
The presented forecasts for fiscal deficits do not take into consideration the actual impact of 
EU transfers or the costs of accession. The amount of commitments for payments is defined by the 
Copenhagen  Summit  (see  Table  2),  but  the  actual  usage  of  EU  financial  sources  and  real 
payments from the EU budget is still unknown and strongly depends on the individual absorption 
capacities of applicants. The majority of enlargement-related costs are supposed to be assumed 
by state budgets, while transfers will be channeled not only to the state budgets. Taking these two 
factors into account, alongside the lower absorption of funds, EU fund allocation may be lower than 
expected and the fiscal position of the EU candidates could deteriorate further in the first two years 
after accession.  
The impact of EU transfers on the New Member States 
At  its  meeting  in  Berlin  on  March  24-25,  1999,  the  European  Council  confirmed  that 
enlargement is an historic priority for the European Union, and that the accession negotiations 
would  continue  “each  in  accordance  with  its  own  rhythm  and  as  rapidly  as  possible”.  In  the 
framework of Agenda 2000, the Berlin European Council adopted new financial perspectives for 
the Union in the context of enlargement, covering the period 2000-2006. These perspectives make 
financial provision both for pre-accession expenditure and post-accession transfers from the new 
Member States to join the EU as of May 1, 2004. On the basis of the Berlin decisions, the total 
financial package agreed by EU leaders on December 12-13, 2002 at the Copenhagen European 
Council meeting concluded negotiations with ten countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta).  
The Copenhagen Summit agreed the financial framework for enlargement, with nearly € 41 
billion in terms of commitments (€ 25 billion foreseen for payments) for the period 2004-2006 (see 
Table 2). As has been widely reported, negotiations on the financial package were a tough nut to 
crack. Along with Malta, Poland was reported to have held on to the very end to improve its side of 
the  financial  package,  with  a  deal  only  achieved  in  the  final  hours  of  hard  negotiations  in 
Copenhagen. It is very important to distinguish between planned and actual transfers, however. 
Commitment appropriations and payment appropriations are both planning categories. The former 
category,  commitment  appropriations,  represents  resources  available  in  a  given  year.  Actual 
expenditures  in  individual  projects  need  not  necessarily  start  or  end  in  that  year.  The  second 
category, payment appropriations, is expenditures earmarked in a given year for on-going projects. 
                                                  
6 It should be noted that public finance statistics are not yet fully comparable across countries, and are not yet in line 
with EU definitions. In the framework of the Pre–accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, work is being done to improve 
the quality and comparability of general government accounts. As this work progresses, significant revisions to general 
government deficits are possible. In Slovakia, for example, government support for bank restructuring has not yet been 
accounted for, according to EU definitions.  





















This sum, however, is still a far from actually disbursed resources, which are, to a large extent, 
dependent on the success/failure rate of appropriations for co-financed projects.  
Figure 1. Total transfer allocations in 2004-2006, in percent 
Source: European Commission (2002a), own calculations  
Transfers from the EU budget reach the target countries through a variety of channels. One 
group of transfers is non-project-related and payment appropriations can be taken as real future 
disbursements. This group consists of direct payments, market interventions in agriculture, internal 
actions  (such  as  existing  policies,  institution  building,  or  the  Schengen  facility  fund),  additional 
expenditures  (e.g.  nuclear  safety),  temporary  budgetary  compensation,  or  a  special  cash  flow 
facility fund. The other group consists of project-related transfers where the sum to be disbursed in 
a given year is determined by the amount of EU co-financing successfully secured for individual 
projects.  This  group  includes  transfers  from  the  Structural  Fund and  the  Cohesion  Fund,  rural 
development, as well as the residuals from the pre-accession aid. Project-related transfers require 
national co-financing
7
, thus are in this sense, “expensive” compared to the first group of transfers, 
which do not call for national co-financing. The attempt to increase non-project-related transfers for 




                                                  
7 The typical amounts are 25% for the transfers from the SF, 15% from the CF and 20% for rural development. 
8 Poland’s special deal was the reallocation of € 1 billion from structural activities (expensive and risky types of 
transfers),  partly  to:  a)  unconditional  lump-sum  payments;  and  partly  to:  b)  project-related  payments,  without  co-
financing. The purpose of the deal was to reduce the budget deficit, which would result from having to top up direct 
payments to Polish farmers. The Czech Republic managed to secure a similar deal for EUR 100 million.   
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Table 2. Copenhagen agreed a financial framework for enlargement - Total commitment 
appropriations 2004-2006* for the 10 new Member States (€ millions, 1999 prices) 
  POL  HU  CZ  SLK  SLV  EST  LET  LIT  CY  MAL  TOTAL 
Agriculture  4636  1483  1120  628  401  254  725  401  115  28  9791 
CAP  2093  949  638  276  151  120  291  110  49  4  4682 
Rural development  2543  534  482  352  250  134  434  291  66  24  5110 
Structural actions **  11369  2847  2328  1560  405  618  1366  1036  101  79  21747 
Internal policies  1817  559  419  329  222  127  539  175  48  20  4256 
Existing policies                      2642 
Institution building                      380 
Schengen facility  280  148  0  48  107  69  136  71  0  0  859 
Nuclear safety  0  0  0  90  0  0  285  0  0  0  375 
Special cash-flow facility 
(cash advance)  1443  211  358  86  101  22  47  26  38  66  2398 
Temporary budgetary 
compensation (cash adv.)  0  0  389  0  131  0  0  0  300  166  986 
Total Commitments (without 
administration)  19265  5100  4614  2603  1260  1021  2678  1638  602  359  40851 
Administration (estimation)  789  209  188,9  106,6  51,6  41,8  109,7  67,1  24,6  14,7  1673 
The share of the payments 
***  48.6%  13.1%  12.0%  6.3%  3.6%  2.6%  6.7%  4.0%  1.8%  1.1%  100% 
Source: European Commission (2002a), own calculations 
* - Where appropriate, allocations by country are shown. For the Schengen facility, nuclear safety, special cash-flow 
facility  and  temporary  budgetary  compensation,  these  amounts  are  fixed.  For  structural  actions  and  rural 
development,  these  amounts  are  indicative.  Allocations  by  country  for  agricultural  market  measures,  direct 
payments, existing internal policies, institution building cannot be definitively fixed at this stage 
** - Includes € 38 millions of non-allocated technical assistance. 
*** - The share of the payments does not include administration commitments estimation. 
The  main  stream  of  investment  and  support  financing  is  covered  by  three  key  funds 
(agriculture support, Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund). These key funds constitute more than 
70 percent of total funds in Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Poland and Lithuania. In the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia, the share of these key funds is smaller, at 66 percent and 55 percent, 
respectively.  Due  to  higher  fiscal  deficits,  Malta,  Cyprus,  Slovenia,  and  the  Czech  Republic 
negotiated special lump sum payments. This was the reason for different structures of transfers in 
these countries.  
The largest share of the Copenhagen financial package was designated to finance structural 
actions in the new Member States. Some € 22 billion has been set aside for this purpose over the 
three years 2004-2006, one-third of which will be for the Cohesion Fund and internal actions and 
two-thirds  for  Structural  Funds.  EU  financial  assistance  from  Structural  and  Cohesion  funds  is  
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project-based, that is, it is only paid on the basis of approved projects that are implemented in AC-
10, if and when they are carried out
9
.  











Source: European Commission (2002a), own calculations 
Note: Pre-accession aid is excluded from the analyses while it was negotiated earlier and guaranteed 
Co-financing 
The project-related transfers (SF, CF, rural development, as well as pre-accession assistance) 
require national co-financing. Other groups of non-project-related transfers do not. Total project-
related  transfers  amount  to  €  18.5  billion.  The  typical  amounts  for  project  co-financing  are  25 
percent from transfers from the SF, 15 percent from the CF, 20 percent for rural development and 
30-40 percent for pre-accession assistance, depending on the project type.  
Total  maximum  required  co-financing  of  project-related  transfers  in  AC-10  in  2004-2006 
amounts to over € 4 billion. A part of this sum will significantly burden the state budgets and local 
governments  who  will  implement  projects  that  have  not  previously  been  financed  from  their 
budgets (mainly new environmental projects and transport infrastructure).  
Investment project co-financing can be also credited from the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and other international financial institutions, such as: the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development  (EBRD),  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD),  the 
International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC),  the  Nordic  Investment  Bank  (NIB),  the  Nordic 
Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) and the Council of Europe Development Bank. 
In  January  2000,  the  EIB’s  Board  of  Governors  approved  an  extension  of  the  EIB’s  pre-
accession facility for lending to the candidate countries of up to € 8.5 billion over a period of three 
                                                  
9
 However, in order to ensure that even on a cash flow basis the AC-10 remain in a net beneficiary position, all of the AC-
10 will receive additional cash flow lump sum payments and some of the AC-10 will receive temporary budgetary com-
pensation.  
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and a half years. The international institutions’ pre-accession support covers priority investment in 
all the candidate countries, in particular those projects that facilitate the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire and strengthening integration with the EU. The financing covers all sectors and 
focuses on environmental protection, the development of transport, telecommunication and energy 
links, industrial competitiveness and regional development. 
Cooperation with the EIB, the EBRD and other institutions has resulted in the joint co-financing 
of a substantial number of projects in accession countries since 1998. 
At the project level, the exchange of information is carried out at a very early stage in the 
procedure of project identification in order to select possible proposals for co-financing. 
The financial contributions of the new Member States 
All candidate countries, on joining the EU, will be required – as EU countries - to pay their 
annual contribution to the common EU budget. This is made up of a contribution in the form of 
payments  of  a  part  of  VAT  revenues  collected  in  AC-10,  customs  duties  collected  on  non-EU 
imports  and  an  additional  contribution  based  on  the  country’s  Gross  National  Product  (GNP). 
Additionally, each EU country also contributes to a rebate that is granted to the United Kingdom on 
its budgetary contribution
10
 (known as ‘the UK Rebate’ or “the British rebate”). 
Most of the acceding countries (only AC-8) must pay an equal contribution equivalent to 1.27 
percent  of  annual  GDP  in  2005  and  2006.  Malta  and  Cyprus  are  obliged  to  pay  a  higher 
membership contribution (1.5 percent of GDP), while their transfer structures are different than the 
AC-8. Postponing the accession date from January 1 to May 1, 2004 will reduce by one third the 
annual contributions in 2004 to the level of 0.85 percent of GDP in AC-8 and to 1 percent of GDP 
in the island countries.  
The total agreed contributions to the EU budget by all new entrants (AC-10) in 2004 amounted 
to € 4 billion; total financial contributions amounted to over € 16 billion during the first three years 
after accession (at 2004 prices). 
The  full  contribution  to  the  EU  budget  comes  from  state  budgets.  The  most  important 
component of the membership contribution fee is GNP resources (67 percent of the contribution 
will  be  taken  from  own  resources  of  state  budgets).  Ten  percent  of  applicants’  budgetary 
contributions  will  come  from  customs  duties  and  agricultural  levies  (another  name  for  this 
component  is  ‘traditional  own  allocations’).  Twelve  percent  will  be  taken  from  countries’  VAT 
resources, over three years. As a part of the budgetary contribution, acceding countries will also 
have to pay the UK rebate. This is part of sharing the burden generated by a 75 percent reduction 
                                                  
10 The British rebate was negotiated by the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1984 in Fontainebleau as a 
way of reducing the difference between money paid by Britain into the EU and its receipts from EU payouts. Britain 
gained less than other EU members like France, Spain, and the Former East Germany from the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Thanks to payments from CAP subsidy system, France is a net beneficiary, while Britain is a net contributor. 
According to official statement of the UK, it is estimated that without the abatement provided by the rebate, the UK would 
be paying 3 times more than France. After enlargement of the EU to include 10 new member stares, UK and French 
contributions will be similar.   
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granted to Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden from their normal financing share. The 
total agreed part of the UK rebate to be paid by acceding countries amounted to € 1.5 billion
11
. 
Figure 3. Structure of the membership contribution fees in AC-8 in 2004 and 2005-2006, as a 

































Source: European Commission (2002a), AMECO database, own calculations 
The  membership  contribution  fee  is  supposed  to  be  paid  to  the  EU  budget  in  monthly 
installments, at the beginning of each month starting from May 2004. This obligation was imposed 
in  order  to  assure  regular  payments,  as  well  as  to  avoid  temporary  liquidity  problems  in  state 
budgets. However, one unfavorable aspect for the acceding countries of this payment system must 
be considered. There is a time lag between the contribution fee to the EU budget (paid up-front) 
and incoming transfers (ex-post reimbursement of incurred expenses). A transitional period may be 
needed because new Member States will contribute fully to the EU budget, but at the same time 
will not participate fully in all EU policies from the first day of membership and therefore will not 
benefit from the full EU system of subsidies from the start. This applies, for instance, to the EU 
agricultural subsidy, which is partly paid retrospectively. Starting from May 2004, relatively poor 
new EU countries will have to contribute fully to the EU budget, but will not receive a large part of 
the agricultural subsidy until the following year – probably in 2005 (Poland is one of them). Thus, 
there is a risk of covering some additional expenses from the state budgets, especially in the first 
year or two years after accession. 
 
                                                  
11 The rest of the rebate will be financed by Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden. In 2001, the whole 
British rebate amounted to £2.8 billion, in 2002, £2 billion, and in 2003 £3 billion. In 2001, the whole British rebate 
amounted to £2.8 billion, in 2002, £2 billion, and in 2003 £3 billion.  
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Cost-benefit analysis of accession – net financial positions of the 
new Member States 
EU transfers and the membership contributions are the most important factors influencing new 
members’ financial position after accession. This category is fully measurable and an accountable 
base (assuming the possible absorption rate of project-related transfers) for assessment of future 
net fiscal positions does exist.  
The net project-related transfers (diminished by necessary co-financing) amounted to € 14.3 
billion in 2004-2006 (in 1999 prices). The non-project related transfers (including budget liquidity 
support) amounted to € 9.4 billion. Own resources, i.e. the new members’ contribution to the EU 
budget, will amount to approximately € 14.7 billion (1999 prices). The sum of these figures, as well 
as  the  estimated  success/failure  rate  for  the  project-related  transfers,  provide  a  basis  for  the 
calculation of the net financial position the ten new members can expect as a group.  
During the first three years of membership, AC-10 will get from the EU only € 9 billion more 
than they will pay (under the key assumption of full transfer absorption). This will make the new 
members  net  beneficiaries  only  in  the  case  of  absorption  above  37  percent  of  project-related 
transfers (weighted average minimum absorption rate for AC-10, see Table 4). In the case of lower 
absorption, the group will be a net contributor.  
The  limited  institutional  capacities  of  the  new  members  may  be  an  important  obstacle  to 
absorbing  EU  structural  funds,  especially  at  the  beginning  of  the  accession  process.  This  will 
obviously result in deeper fiscal deficits in state budgets then paying full membership contribution 
fees. In the case of wasting opportunities to use the full amount of the EU transfers, the state 
budgets will obtain fewer financial sources to finance investment. This way, EU transfer absorption 
capacity becomes a crucial issue for the future fiscal stance of the acceding countries.  
During the 2000-2002 period, the actual usage of structural assistance granted under the ISPA 
(financial  resources  on  transport  infrastructure  and  environmental  protection)  was  very  small. 
Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, with a rate of ISPA funds absorption of 9-10 percent, 
did not use the opportunity to benefit fully from the funds allocated to them. Slovenia, Lithuania, 
Estonia and Hungary, with rates of 13-19 percent, were better prepared to absorb and benefit from 
the  ISPA  funds.  The  investment  in  transport  infrastructure  (highways,  bridges,  and  transport 
solutions in urban areas) is one of the most important and visible advantages accession will bring 
to the average citizen. But that chance was lost, second - and possibly - chance for infrastructure 
improvement may be Cohesion Fund transfers. It is difficult to say what absorption of transfers will 
be, but with such a modest usage of the project-related funds, the net transfers to the budget will 
without much doubt be smaller, bringing in turn deterioration in the fiscal deficit.   
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Table 3. Pre-accession ISPA fund allocations and absorption in 2000-2002, € millions 
  ISPA allocations  Usage of the ISPA funds  Absorption rate (percent) 
Poland  2053  203.0  9.9 
Slovakia  279  28.0  10.0 
Latvia  277  27.9  10.0 
Czech Republic  349  37.4  10.7 
Hungary  547  68.1  12.4 
Estonia  121  17.7  14.6 
Lithuania  252  42.7  16.9 
Slovenia  70.4  13.4  19.0 
Source: European Commission (2002f) 
In order to estimate the acceding countries’ net financial positions on acceding to the EU, the 
minimum absorption rate for each country was calculated. The rate (x) is the minimum level of 
project-related transfers engaged in domestic structural reforms in 2004-2006 sufficient to retain a 
positive  net  financial  position  in  terms  of  EU  transfers  after  budget  support  receipts  and  EU 
membership payments are taken into account. 
 
            EU membership contribution – non-project-related transfers – budget support* 
  x  =  
                                            project-related transfers – co-financing 
 
* - budget support = temporary budgetary compensation + special cash flow facility,  
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Table 4. The net financial position of the new members under various project-related fund 
absorptions in 2004-2006, as a percentage of GDP. Minimum absorption rate of project-related 
transfers, in percent 
Net financial position under various transfers’ absorption.  
GDP percent 
 
100%  75%  50%  30% 
Minimum absorption 
rate (x) 
Estonia  1.7  1.2  0,8  0,4  6 
Lithuania  2.1  1.6  1,1  0,7  7 
Latvia  2.2  1.6  0,9  0,4  14 
Poland  0.8  0.5  0.2  -0,1  35 
Slovakia  0.6  0.3  0,0  -0,2  46 
Hungary  0.4  0.2  0,0  -0,2  51 
Slovenia  0.2  0.0  -0,1  -0,2  70 
Czech Republic  0.1  0.0  -0,1  -0,3  75 
Weighted average minimum rate of absorption in AC-10  37 
Weighted average minimum rate of absorption  
in AC-8 (AC-10 minus island countries) 
25 
Source: European Commission (2002a), AMECO database, own calculations 
As indicated in Table 4, the net position of individual members within the group may vary 
considerably depending on the negotiated amount of transfers and transfer absorption, also taking 
into account each country’s starting fiscal position. 
In transfer terms, one can clearly see who are the beneficiaries and who are the losers. The 
biggest beneficiaries of EU assistance are the Baltic States. The negotiated amounts of transfers 
and their structure provided a very low estimated minimum absorption rate for the Baltic States 
(from 6 percent in Estonia to 14 percent in Latvia). This allows them to keep the net beneficiary 
position  even  under  low  structural  (and  other  expensive)  investments.  However,  without  the 
implementation of investment projects, the effect of accession on the economy as a whole may be 
limited and economic growth reduced. With an absorption rate of 75 percent of the project-related 
transfers, the net position of the Baltics is the strongest among the AC-10, estimated at 1.6 percent 
of GDP in Lithuania and Latvia and of 1.2 percent of GDP in Estonia.  
Slovakia and Poland, with the minimum absorption rates of 46 and 35 percent, respectively, 
belong to the second sub-group of beneficiaries in terms of transfers. Their net financial positions 
are located at the medium level of the whole group. With absorption rates of 75 percent of the 
project-related transfers, the net position of Poland is estimated at a level of 0.5 percent of GDP 
and Slovakia at 0.3 percent of GDP.  
Countries benefiting least in terms of GDP are Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Their net positions in terms of GDP are the weakest among the AC-10 group. With absorption 
rates of 75 percent of the project-related transfers, the net position of the countries from this group 
is  estimated  at  a  minor  level  in  Slovenia  and  Hungary.  The  Czech  Republic’s  net  position  is 
insignificant at this level of transfer absorption. Hungary will have a positive financial net position  
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only if that country is able to use more than half (51 percent) of the project-related transfers (in the 
case of the Czech Republic 75 percent, and Slovenia 70 percent). After accession, higher fiscal 
deficit is likely to be observed in these countries. In order to avoid it, the countries should use the 
EU’s help as much as they can. The benefits of accession in terms of GDP are the weakest among 
this group. 
The main conclusion stemming from this analysis is that accession countries should aim to 
concentrate  their  efforts  on  maximum  absorption  of  EU  transfers  so  as  to  assure  sustainable 
growth after accession (in the case of countries with more favorable amounts and fund structures) 
and to support their net fiscal positions (in the case of countries with less favorable amounts and 
fund structures). 
Figure 4. Net positions of AC-10 in 2004-2006, as a percentage of GDP. Lines – net financial positions 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: European Commission (2002a), AMECO database, own calculations   
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Net fiscal positions in acceding countries
12 
As analyzed in the preceding body of this paper, the national net financial position resulting 
from negotiations is an important determinant of the future fiscal position of accession countries. 
The usage of funds also influences the size of deficits and the scope of economic advantages 
stemming  from  accession  (among  others:  private  sector  expansion,  FDI  inflow,  labor  market 
development and economic growth). Any fiscal deficits which may occur in AC-10 at the beginning 
of membership may stem primarily from the above-described factors as well as from other direct 
and indirect enlargement-related factors (mainly on the expenditure side).  
A substantial additional fiscal burden on state budgets will be imposed upon accession. There 
are few substantive estimates in the literature on the impact of structural reforms (which will be 
partially financed from state budgets and EU transfers) on the public finances. In August 2002, 
each candidate country submitted to the Commission its own National Development Plan, updates 
of their Pre-accession Economic Programs, submitted in 2001, presenting country strategy and 
reform implementation to increase country capacity to compete on the common EU market. The 
latest European Commission assessment of the National Development Plans suggests a lack of 
sufficient information on the implementation of structural reforms and very weak estimation of their 
costs or impact on budgets.  
The costs of reform implementation are connected to the adoption of some specific acquis 
communautaire,  particularly  in  fiscally  sensitive  areas,  such  as  environmental  protection, 
infrastructure,  transportation,  public  administration,  social  policy,  external  border  control,  etc. 
Adoption of EU standards and regulations - contained in 31 chapters under negotiation between 
the European Commission and the governments of the accession countries – imposes a major 
adjustment burden on both the public and private sectors of the accession countries. The cost of 
compliance for governments is particularly heavy in the areas of environmental protection (air and 
water  quality,  waste  management)  and  transportation  infrastructure  (road  construction  and 
upgrading of railroads). The additional infrastructure expenditures may require up to 1.5 percent of 
GDP annually in additional budgetary outlays
13
, which is even more than the financial contribution 
to the EU budget. As indicated, expenditures may be partially offset by Cohesion Fund transfers. In 
any event, the estimates are subject to a considerable margin of uncertainty, as they depend on 
the time-frame of implementation agreed upon with the EU.  
A  second  important  accession-related  cost  is  public  administration  reform,  which  can  be 
partially  offset  by  transfers  from  the  additional  expenditure  category.  In  order  to  develop  the 
appropriate capacity of those institutions responsible for managing the funds, applicants should 
provide approximately one additional percent of GDP from public sources. 
                                                  
12 Due to different transfer structures in Malta and Cyprus these island countries are excluded from further analysis. 
13 On the basis of estimates by the World Bank (1997, 1999) for Estonia, Hungary and Poland.  
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There are also some positive fiscal effects of accession. The most important is the possible 
reduction or elimination of some budgetary expenditure as a result of EU transfers (eg. agriculture 
support). Under the CAP, it is envisaged that the traditional crop-specific price subsidy program will 
be replaced by income-support transfers to agricultural producers. Uncertainty about the timing 
and scope of this reform (some of the particularities are known only for Poland) is compounded by 
uncertainty  concerning  the  reduction  of  agricultural  protection  scheduled  under  the  Doha 
(Millennium) Round. Allocations under the reformed CAP will also depend on the recognition of 
existing agricultural subsidies in eligible accession countries on the eve of accession.  
In any event, the magnitude of these transfers will be primarily determined by the overall size 
of the agricultural sector in each country (very high in Poland and low in Estonia). While most CAP 
transfers are channeled directly to eligible producers in the private sector, they would to some 
extent act as a substitute for some farm subsidies. The phase-out of farm subsidies, along with 
non-farm subsidies slated for elimination under EU standards on state aid and competition, could 




Another  positive  fiscal  aspect  of  accession  would  be  additional  revenues  from  indirect-tax 
harmonization. Member countries are obliged to harmonize the statutory base of VAT and excises 
and observe minimum statutory rates. The EU average standard VAT rate is 19.7 percent, while in 
AC-8 it is 20.8 percent
15
.  While VAT rates in most accession countries are significantly above the 
minimum rates (15 percent standard rate, 5 percent reduced rate), their excises on energy and fuel 
tend to be below the minimum rates. VAT rates in none of the accession countries are below the 
described minimum. Some of the countries also provide significant exemptions from VAT and they 
are expected to be abolished. Consequently, after accession, the new members should recoup, on 
average, revenues of around 0.5 percent of GDP mainly from a broadening of their VAT base, 
higher excise duties and eco-taxes. 
As regards tax revenues, accession should lead to the removal of customs duties on imports 
from EU members and assumption of a common external tariff (at 5.5 percent rate) on non-EU 
imports. However, in low tariff countries (such as, for example Estonia, with a near zero rate), this 
would result in a small gain. Depending on the country tariff rates, realignment of customs duties 
will result in mixed effects, from -0.5 percent of GDP in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia to +0.5 percent of GDP in Estonia.  
                                                  
14
 According to the Kopits & Szekely (2002) estimate, the phase-out of production subsidies in Poland will bring 2 
percent of GDP savings on subsidies, mainly currently directed to farmers.  
15 On the basis of Dobrinsky, (2002) and own calculations  
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Table 5. Direct fiscal effects of accession and net fiscal positions on accession in AC-8 on average in 
2004-2006, as a percentage of GDP 
  CZ  EE  HU  PL  SL  LT  LV  SK 
Fiscal effects of EU transfers 
1. Fiscal effects of EU transfers  -0.6  -0.2  -0.7  -0.5  -0.5  0.1  0.0  -0.6 
Membership contribution  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1  -1.1 
Special cash-flow facility  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Temporary budgetary compensation  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Net CF transfers  
(15% of co-financing)  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.4  0.1 
Internal actions  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Additional expenditures  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.3  0.2 
Other direct fiscal effects of accession 
2. Other fiscal effects of accession   -2.5  -2.0  -1.5  -1.3  -1.3  -2.0  -2.0  -2.3 
Infrastructure expenditures  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  -1.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5 
Reform of public administration  -1.5  -1.5  -1.0  -1.5  -1.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5 
Phase-out of production subsidies  1.0  0.3  1.5  2.0  1.0  0.3  0.3  1.0 
Realignment of custom duties  -0.5  0.3  -0.5  -0.5  -0.5  0.3  0.3  -0.3 
Tax harmonization  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.0 
Total net fiscal position (1+2)  -3.1  -2.3  -2.2  -1.8  -1.7  -2.0  -2.1  -2.9 
Source: Kopits, Szekely (2002), own calculations 
In view of the diversity of effects across accession countries, as well as uncertainty as to the 
timing and size of indirect effects, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive picture of the fiscal 
costs-benefits of accession. The estimated net fiscal position of the individual applicant countries is 
provided in Table 5. There are two main groups of direct fiscal effects of accession influencing the 
future  fiscal  stance  on  acceding  countries.  The  first  group  represents  the  fiscal  effects  of  EU 
transfers which are directly channeled to the government sector and membership fee. The special 
cash flow facility, temporary budgetary compensation, net CF transfers (diminished by 15% of co-
financing), internal actions, additional expenditure and membership contributions give a net fiscal 
gain on negotiated transfers of from -0.6 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic to + 0.1 percent of 
GDP in Lithuania.  The second group of direct fiscal effects consists of the following components: 
infrastructure  expenditures,  public  administration  reform,  phase-out  of  production  subsidies, 
realignment of custom duties and tax harmonization. The fiscal effect of the second group was 
stronger that in the first group and amounted to direct fiscal effects ranging from -2.5 percent of 
GDP in the Czech Republic to -1.3 percent GDP in Poland and Slovenia.  
On balance, accession appears to have an unfavorable direct net effect on applicants’ general 
governments of up to minus 3 percent of GDP (see Table 5).   
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The calculation of net fiscal position is based on the following three important assumptions: 
1.  the  accession  countries  will  use  the  full  amounts  of  project-related  EU  transfers 
channeled to the government sector, 
2.  these funds will substitute one for one for other government expenditures, and  
3.  all of the transfers and payments are presented in the national financial system
16
.  
In the case of lower absorption or lower substitution, negative net financial results imply further 
deterioration in the net fiscal positions of acceding countries. 
The increased deficits of accession countries are likely to be partly compensated over time by 
favorable indirect fiscal effects.  
Fiscal  deficit  increases  impose  additional  restrictions  on  the  new  Member  States  and  may 
postpone their accession to the Euro zone.  
 
Figure 5. Direct fiscal effects of accession and net fiscal position upon accession in AC-8,  
in 2004-2006, as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Kopits, Szekely (2002), own calculations 
Notes: * - these non-project related transfers which are channeled through the public sector,  
** - budget support =  temporary budgetary compensation + special cash flow facility,  
*** - other fiscal effects of accession: infrastructure expenditures, reform of public administration, phase-out of production 
subsidies, realignment of custom duties, tax harmonization 
                                                  
16 The calculated deficit increases are of maximum values, what means that all of the transfers and payments are 
presented in the national financial system. There are still uncertainties about transfer classification as the above- or 
under-the-line items in particular national budgets. If some of the payments are classified as under-the-line items in the 
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Conclusions 
Net fiscal gains on negotiated EU transfers are only one aspect of the multiple implications of 
EU accession for the new members’ budgets. The costs of complying with the acquis (especially in 
additional  infrastructure  and  environmental  protection),  phasing  out  production  subsidies,  tax 
harmonization, and, finally, reducing risk premiums in financing will have deeper repercussions 
than membership contribution payments for the prospective new members’ state budgets. The 
impact of all the direct fiscal effects of accession is estimated to mean fiscal deficits deteriorating 
by up to 3 percent of GDP in the first few years after accession, what can be a serious reason for 
the delays in Euro zone accession. In the longer-run, some positive indirect fiscal aspects may 
start to play a role.  
The current fiscal status (in terms of low budget deficits) of the Baltic States is the strongest 
among the group. The minimum absorption rates for these countries were also estimated at very 
low levels. Due to strong net fiscal gains on negotiated transfers (which are to cover the necessary 
expenditure on infrastructure) and low levels of current fiscal deficits, their estimated net fiscal 
positions are the strongest in the group. 
Some applicant countries, especially those with the highest current fiscal deficits within the 
group (the Czech Republic and Hungary) may expect serious difficulties keeping their fiscal deficits 
under control after accession. The estimated fiscal effects on state budgets confirm their weak 
fiscal prospects. It is even more important for them as the calculated minimum absorption rates in 
these countries are also the highest in the group. 
As was illustrated earlier in this paper, EU fund absorption became a crucial issue only in the 
case  of  determining  the  net  financial  positions  of  new  Member  States.  As  EU  transfers  cover 
accession-related expenditure to a very limited extent, the absorption rate of the EU funds is less 
important to the calculation of the net fiscal position. Starting fiscal positions are more important 
than  the  absorption  rate  for  each  acceding  country,  though  the  Baltic  States  seem  to  have  a 
favorable stance in both respects. 
The advantages of membership, however, are not equivalent to the net financial or net fiscal 
positions  of  the  new  Member  States.  Gains  from  the  new  wave  of  foreign  direct  investment, 
decreasing  transaction  costs  of  trade,  transport,  industrial  co-operation  and  simplifying  of 
international  co-operation  procedures,  and  the  opportunities  offered  by  the  free  access  to  the 
European single market (not to mention the political and security aspects and the modernization of 
the institutional and legal system following acceptance of the acquis communautaire), are much 
more  important  than  temporary  fiscal  imbalances.  Possible  non-enlargement  would  entail 
considerable costs for the ten applicant countries in terms of the opportunities they would lose of 
achieving higher GDP growth rates and structural change.  
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